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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole questions presented by Petitioners for 
review are itemized on Pages 1-2 of Petitioner's Petition. 
Respondent Overland Thrift & Loan ("Respondent Overland") 
asserts no issues for review herein and further asserts that 
all issues presented by Petitioners were correctly reviewed 
and adjudicated by the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals. 
TRANSCRIPT OF OPINION 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals for which 
Petitioner seeks review is reported at 818 P. 2d 1316. A true 
and accurate copy of such opinion as reported therein is 
attached hereto as Appendix A. 
JURISDICTION 
The opinion of which Petitioners seek review was 
filed with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals on October 17, 
1991. On November 15, 1991, the Court of Appeals entered an 
order denying Petitioners' request for rehearing. Respondent 
Overland acknowledges that the Supreme Court has sole 
discretion to grant or deny a petition for writ of certiorari 
or to review Court of Appeals decisions pursuant to § 78-2-
2(5) Utah Code Ann. (1989, as amended). Respondent Overland 
also asserts that the considerations and guidelines set forth 
in Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
1 
( "U. R. A. P. ,f) , while neither controlling nor exhaustive, 
present general guidelines for segregating issues appropriate 
for this Court's consideration and judicial intervention.1 
All such relevant jurisdictional provisions are set forth and 
included in Appendix B. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
All relevant statutory provisions pertaining to the 
issues presented by Petitioner are set forth in their entirety 
in Appendix C. These provisions include the following: 
§ 57-1-32, Utah Code Ann. (1985, as amended), 
§ 48-1-12 Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
§ 70A-1-201(37) Utah Code Ann. (1990, as amended) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
CASE HISTORY 
This action was originally filed by Petitioners Dale 
L. Larson, Grethe Larson, and Systematic Builders, Inc. in the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. (R. 002) Nearly three years after its original filing, 
and on March 1, 1990, March 27, 1990, and May 14, 1990, 
respectively, the District Court granted a series of motions 
for partial summary judgment in favor of Respondents herein• 
1
 Respondent Overland contends that the issues presented by Petitioners in the instant case fail to satisfy the general 
and basic categories set forth by Rule 46 o\ the Utah Rules o( Appellate Procedure, and thus fails even the most basic qualifying 
guidelines. 
2 
(R. 845-847, 936-940, 1018-1021) Pursuant to such court 
adjudications and an oral stipulation between the parties, the 
District Court certified such partial summary judgment 
collectively as a final judgment on June 26, 1990, pursuant to 
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 1037-1038) 
Petitioners filed an Amended Notice of Appeal in the 
Supreme Court on July 6, 1990. (R. 1047) On July 31, 1990, 
the Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) and 78-2A-3(2) (j ) , Utah Code 
Ann. (1990, as amended). 
On or about June 20, 1991, after duly filing briefs 
in accordance with the respective positions, oral arguments 
were heard by the Court of Appeals. On or about October 17, 
1991, the Court of Appeals filed with the Clerk of the Court 
its Opinion in the matter ("Opinion11), a copy of which is set 
forth in its entirety in Appendix A herein. (Appendix A) 
Petitioners thereafter filed a Request for Rehearing, which 
request was denied by order of the Utah Court of Appeals dated 
November 15, 1991. Petitioners petitioned this Court for a 
Writ of Certiorari on or about December 16, 1991. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
* "ff'On or about November 27, 1984, Robert J. Lucking and 
Dale L. Larson dba L&L Wire, EDM, a Utah partnership, ("L&L 
Wire11) executed and delivered to PFC, Inc. ("PFC") a 
commercial lease ("Lease"), pertaining to the lease of certain 
3 
industrial equipment ("Equipment"). (R. 675; Deposition of 
Robert Lucking, Pg. 66, Lines 10-13; Opinion, 818 P.2d 1318) 
Robert Lucking is the son-in-law of Plaintiff DaLe L. Larson. 
(Deposition of Dale L. Larson, Pg. 7, Lines 19-20). 
In conjunction with the lease, Plaintiff Dale L. 
Larson ("Dale Larson") executed and delivered to PFC a 
personal equipment lease guaranty ("Guaranty") guaranteeing 
all amounts to become due and owing under the terms of the 
Lease. (Opinion, 818 P.2d 1318; R. 677; R. 663-667) 
In order to provide additional security for the 
payment of obligations arising under the Lease, Plaintiff 
Grethe Larson ("Grethe Larson"), wife of Dale Larson, executed 
a trust deed ("Trust Deed") on a home owned by Dale Larson and 
Grethe Larson as joint tenants. (Opinion, 818 P.2d 1318; R. 
103; R. 654-656; Deposition of Grethe Larson, Pg. 69-70, 72, 
74-75, 77) Grethe Larson allegedly signed both her own name 
and the name of her husband to the Trust Deed. (Opinion, 818 
P.2d 1318; R. 103; Deposition of Grethe Larson, Pg. 69-70, 72, 
74-75, 77) 
At no time prior to the filing of this action did 
Respond^wt^ Overland Thrift & Loan ("Overland") know that 
Grethe Larson had signed the name of her husband to the Trust 
Deed. (R. 080) 
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On or about November 28, 1984, all rights and 
interests of PFC in and to the Lease and Guaranty were 
assigned to Overland. (Opinion, 818 P.2d 1318) 
Thereafter, L&L Wire defaulted under the terms of 
the Lease. (Opinion, 818 P.2d 1318; R. 078-079) Robert 
Lucking subsequently filed bankruptcy. 
After numerous unsuccessful attempts to obtain 
payment, Respondent Overland caused the Trust Deed to record 
a Notice of Default and Election to Sale on January 24, 1987. 
(R. 022-023) Respondent Overland repossessed the equipment on 
February 15, 1987 (R. 234, 236) and placed the equipment for 
advertisement and sale with Utah Machine Tool Exchange, a 
widely recognized dealer in industrial machine sales and 
equipment sales. (R. 954) After full compliance with all 
statutory requirements regarding the sale of real property, a 
Trustee's Sale of the real property was subsequently held on 
May 27, 1987, and a Trustee's Deed was delivered to Overland 
as purchaser of the real property. (R. 923, 927-928) 
On May 19, 1987, Petitioners commenced this action 
by filing the first of six complaints seeking to void the 
Trust Deed and enjoin the Trustee's Sale. (R. 002-003, 155-
158, 245-251, 278-288, 332-335, 392-413) Respondent Overland 
counterclaimed asserting among other things, a right to 
recover under the terns of the Lease and the Guaranty, 
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declaratory relief as to the interest of Grethe Larson and 
unjust enrichment. 
On March 1, 1990, pursuant to a Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed by Respondents Linda Milne and Western Surety, 
the District Court dismissed all claims against said 
respondents. (Opinion, 818 P.2d 1318; R. 845-846) 
On March 27, 1990, pursuant to Respondent Overland7s 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 640-718) , the court 
granted partial summary judgment on several distinct issues. 
(R. 936-939, 1054) Such issues included: (1) entitlement to 
dismissal of Systematic Builders, Inc. ("Systematic") since 
Systematic had neither made an express claim against 
Respondent Overland nor had Overland been able to discovery 
any involvement of Systematic in the transaction (R. 937); 
(2) entitlement to summary judgment with respect to the 
transfer and severance of the joint tenancy interest of 
Petitioner Grethe Larson in the deeded real property (R. 937) ; 
(3) entitlement to a judgment on liability issues against 
Petitioner Dale L. Larson under the terms of the Guaranty 
(R. 938) ; and (4) entitlement to summary judgment on liability 
issues against Petitioner Dale Larson on the Lease pursuant to 
his status as partner of L&L Wire (R. 938); (5) a 
determination that the Lease constituted a true lease as a 
matter of law (R. 938) ; (6) that Petitioners had failed after 
three years to provide any evidence of fraud or duress, and 
6 
that all claims of fraud should be dismissed (R. 937) ; and (7) 
that summary judgment regarding claims of double recovery and 
penalty be granted since Respondent Overland was seeking to 
recover only amounts due after offset of sale proceeds 
(Opinion, 818 P.2d 1318-1319; R. 938-939) 
On May 14, 1990, and pursuant to a second Motion for 
Summary Judgment on issues remaining unresolved by previous 
adjudications, the court again awarded Respondent Overland 
summary judgment. (Opinion, 818 P.2d 1319; R. 1018-1021) 
Such motion was unopposed by Petitioners. Specifically, the 
court determined: (1) the equipment leased pursuant to the 
Lease had been sold and otherwise disposed of by Respondent 
Overland in good faith (Opinion, 818 P.2d 1319; R. 1019); and 
(2) the amount of liability accruing to Petitioner Dale L. 
Larson under the terms of the Lease and Guaranty. (Opinion, 
818 P.2d 1319; R. 1010-1020) 
One remaining issue regarding the authority of 
Petitioner Grethe Larson to execute the Trust Deed for and on 
behalf of Petitioner Dale L. Larson was withdrawn from the 
litigation pursuant to stipulation between the parties.2 (R. 
1037-1038) 
( h e i l a n d d e t e r m i n e d th.it MIH<. •• •. 'i id ' ^ e n d c t e i m m e d to exist bo th under the G u a r a n t y signed by Dale 
I . i i snn t ind unde i the I case executed In ins , > * i K<>IH n I cak ing, the ie \sas l i t t le economic beneht in c o n t i n u i n g to pursue 
the rema in i ng issue o l whe the i Dale I .nson • , . " . d . • ' . m s k i ol his interest m the real p rope r t y by means o( the T rus t D e e d . 
Such ieal p i o p e i t \ interest cou ld I K .md A is - . , .< m, \ i .h i .uncd In means o l execut ion s.ile pursuant to the ad jud ica ted 
l i<ibiht\ unde i bo th the I ease <md ( m a i m i \ 
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On June 18, 1990, the Petitioners filed a Notice of 
Appeal. (R. 1033) On June 26, 1990, pursuant to Rule 54(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court certified its 
previous orders granting summary judgment as a final judgment. 
(R. 1037-1038) On July 6, 1989, Petitioners filed an Amended 
Notice of Appeal. (R. 1047-1048) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioners have failed to assert any issues which 
(1) demonstrate a conflict of law; (2) which are so far 
departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings to 
warrant Supreme Court supervision; or (3) which present any 
special or important grounds for review. 
Petitioners raise in their Petition several issues, 
which are either issues of first impression herein, issues of 
first impression in the Court of Appeals, or issues which were 
uncontested by Petitioners in the District Court. Such issues 
include non-conformance with statutory foreclosure 
requirements3, issues of alleged satisfaction of liability, 
and awards of attorneys fees. Such issues are now improperly 
brought for review and therefore do not warrant Supreme Court 
supervision. 
Additionally, the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals correctly determined the instant Lease to be a true 
3 A s evidenced by the Petition. IYMIMOIKI-N ha^c tailed to identity any actual and specific failures, but rather allege only 
general unspecified failure 
8 
lease rather than a security agreement. There was at no time 
any dispute regarding the content of the Lease. The parties 
have contested only the legal characterization of the 
document. Consistent with controlling case law, governing 
statutory provisions, and looking to the express language of 
the Lease, the lower courts correctly characterized the Lease 
as a true lease as a matter of law. Petitioners' unsupported 
allegations that the mere existence of certain Colonial 
Leasing factors creates ambiguity are misplaced and contrary 
to existing law. 
Moreover, Petitioners7 claims against Respondents 
Western and Milne are wholly without legal foundation or 
evidentiary support. The alleged improper notarization and 
subsequent recording bear no causal relationship to the 
damages allegedly sustained by Petitioners. The sole and 
singular source of Petitioner Dale Larson's alleged damages 
was his own wife's forgery of his name to the Trust Deed, 
since the Trust Deed was an enforceable instrument 
irrespective of its recorded status. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONFIRMED OVERLAND'S 
JUDGMENT AGAINST PETITIONER DALE LARSON UNDER THE TERMS 
OF THE EQUIPMENT LEASE GUARANTY 
Petitioners assert that the Utah Court of Appeals 
erred in confirming Overland's judgment against Dale Larson 
under the terms of the Equipment Lease Guaranty ("Guaranty"). 
9 
(Petition, Pg. 6) A true and correct copy of such Guaranty is 
attached hereto as Appendix D and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
First, Petitioners generally assert that such 
judgment was improper upon the grounds that Respondent 
Overland allegedly failed to follow the statutory procedures 
set forth in § 57-1-32, U.CA. However, Petitioners have 
failed to identify, either in its Petition herein or in the 
lower courts any specific alleged failure. As demonstrated by 
the record, there is no such alleged failures. 
Petitioners also generally allege that the Lease 
obligation had been fully satisfied. However, Petitioners 
have never presented any evidence below that the Lease 
obligations had been satisfied, or the remaining balance at 
the time of sale was $33,198.98 as asserted in their Petition. 
(Petition, Pg. 7) In fact, Petitioners failed to even file 
any response to Respondent Overland's Motion for Summary 
Judgment regarding damages sustained and the accounting of 
Respondent Overland under the Lease. Not only is there no 
reference in the record to the assertions made by Petitioners 
herein, but Petitioners may not now be heard to seek review of 
determinations which were uncontested by Petitioners in the 
lower court. The Supreme Court will not review alleged error 
when no objection at all is made at the trial level. Lopez v. 
10 
Schwendiman, 720 P.2d. 778 (Utah 1986); Berrett v. Stevens, 
690 P.2d 553 (Utah 1984). 
Petitioners also fail to recognize that the Guaranty 
Agreement contested by Petitioners constitutes a contractual 
obligation completely separate and distinct from the Lease. 
Consequently, Respondent Overland was fully entitled to seek 
breach of contract damages under the terms of the Guaranty. 
Petitioners also assert without explanation that 
Overland has been allowed double recovery on a single claim. 
(Petition, Pg. 7 ) . After reviewing such assertions, the 
arguments presented by Petitioners, and the cases presented in 
conjunction therewith, both the District Court and the Court 
of Appeals determined such claim to be meritless. The cases 
cited by Plaintiffs in support of such arguments, namely 
Industry Financial Corp. v. Redmond, 383 N.W. 2d 847 (N.D. 
1986) and Southwest Park Patient, Ltd. v. Chandler, 572 S.W.2d 
53 (1978) were not applicable to the facts of this case. (R. 
811; Petitioners' Court of Appeals Brief, Pg. 12). Such cases 
involved leases in which the lessor attempted to recover the 
full value of remaining lease payments without granting the 
lessee an appropriate offset for the value of the equipment 
returned. Such courts stated that where a lessor fails to 
provide such an offset, a penalty of double recovery is 
created, thereby creating an inconsistency with general 
contract principals, which seek to award damages only in the 
11 
amount of actual damages sustained. The District Court and 
the Court of Appeals dismissed such claims upon determining 
Overland had a right to recover amounts due under the Lease 
after offset of equipment sale proceeds. (Opinion, 818 P.2d 
1321). Such sale proceeds were in fact credited to 
Petitioners. (R. 963-964) 
Finally, Petitioners argue that the lower courts7 
award of attorneys fees was improper. Contrary to such 
assertions, the District Court found such an award to be 
proper based upon affidavit evidence submitted by Overland as 
well as Petitioners7 complete lack of opposition to 
Respondent's motion for such fees. Moreover, at the time of 
the award, the District Court had before it the volumes of 
records generated over three years of litigation, and was well 
aware of the reasonable fees incurred by the Respondent. The 
Court of Appeals declined to consider the issue by stating: 
The Larsons challenge the award of attorney's fees 
by the trial court as an additional issue on appeal. 
The issue was not listed in the statement of issues 
presented for review in their opening brief, but was 
raised for the first time in their Reply Brief. 
Rule 24(c) of the Appellate Rules of Procedure 
limits answers in a reply brief to new matter in the 
appellee's brief. The issue of attorneys fees was 
not raised as a new matter, either directly or by 
inference, in appellee's brief. We decline 
consideration of the argument, therefore, for 
failure to comply with briefing requirement of the 
rules. See Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 72 
(Utah App. 1991) ; Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of 
Cal., 746 P.2d 1182, 1184-85 (Utah App. 1987). See 
also Demetropolous v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 962 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 
1988) . 
12 
(Opinion, 818 P.2d 1321) Since such issue was never contested 
at the trial court level, and was improperly raised on appeal, 
this Court should also deny consideration of such claims. 
Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d. 778 (Utah 1986); Berrett v. 
Stevens, 690 P.2d 553 (Utah 1984). 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY 
DETERMINED THE LEASE TO BE A TRUE LEASE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW 
Petitioners' assertions that the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals incorrectly interpreted the Lease to be 
a true lease as a matter of law are without foundation or 
merit. The Court of Appeals exhaustively reviewed the Lease 
provisions as well as the precedent and controlling 
considerations utilized in characterizing a document as a true 
lease or a security agreement. (Opinion. 818 P.2d 1319-1320) ; 
Colonial Leasing Co. of New England v. Larsen Bros. Const. 
Co. , 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 
805 P.2d 189 (Utah App. 1991); Utah Code Ann. 70A-1-201(37)). 
In reviewing the Lease document, the Court of Appeals and 
District Courts found persuasive and determinative factors 
such as retention of ownership in the equipment, the option to 
purchase the equipment at fair market value upon Lease 
expiration, governing provisions of the Utah Commercial Code, 
and the express language of the Lease. (Opinion, 818 P. 2d 
1319-1321) 
13 
Petitioners have implied in adhock fashion that the 
agreement "may" be ambiguous. (Appellant Brief, Pg. 10; 
Petition, Pg. 9) Specifically, Petitioners state: "in some 
cases, the basic nature of the agreement, judging solely from 
its contents, may be ambiguous." (Appellant's Brief, Pg. 10, 
emphasis added). However, Plaintiffs have failed, in all 
prior evidentiary or argument presentations to present any 
specific evidence that any terms of the Lease are ambiguous or 
otherwise require parol evidence to decipher their true 
meaning. 
Petitioners and Respondents have never disagreed 
regarding the express language of the Lease, rather they 
contested only the legal characterizations of such language. 
Utah law is clear that the interpretation of an unambiguous 
contract is a question of law when the analysis is based upon 
the language of the agreement and not upon extrinsic evidence. 
LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189, 192 (Utah App. 
1991); Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985); 
Village Inn Apts. v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 790 
P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App. 1990). Contrary to Petitioners' 
assertions, the mere existence of Colonial Leasing factors 
does not create ambiguity, invalidate express statutory 
provisions, nor override the clear and expressed intent 
contained in the language of the Lease. 
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Consequently, the District Court's dismissal of 
Plaintiff's arguments regarding the lease characterization as 
a security instrument and the Court of Appeals affirmance 
thereof were proper and in accordance with controlling Utah 
law. 
C. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENTS MILNE AND WESTERN 
Petitioners also seek review of the Court of Appeals 
affirmation of the summary judgment granted in favor of 
Respondents Western and Milne. Petitioners assert that the 
interests of Dale Larson in and to the subject property was 
somehow damaged by an alleged wrongful notarization of a deed 
which he allegedly did not sign. Respondent Overland asserts 
that Petitioners' conclusions lack causal connection and are 
without merit for several reasons. 
First, any damaged allegedly suffered by Dale Larson 
as a result of the Trust Deed was causally related to his own 
wife's signature of his name to the Trust Deed. But for such 
signing which Dale L. Larson claims to be unauthorized, no 
alleged damage would have been incurred. 
Second, Petitioners have failed to demonstrate a 
causal connection between the notarization and the damages 
allegedly sustained. While an acknowledgement or other proof 
of execution, such as a notarization, is prerequisite to 
recording a deed of trust or other conveyance of real property 
under Utah Code Ann. ** -> '-3-1 (1990), neither recording nor 
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notarization is a necessary condition to enforce a trust deed 
between parties to a conveyance. (Opinion, 813 P. 2d 1323; 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-2(3) (1990); Greqerson v. Jensen, 669 
P.2d 396 (Utah 1983); Horman v. Clarkf 744 P.2d 1014 (Utah 
App. 1987)). Thus, notarization had no bearing upon 
Respondent Overland's right to foreclose upon the subject 
property and no damages can be alleged to arise therefrom. 
Moreover, any attorneys fees incurred by Dale Larson in 
allegedly clearing his name from the Trust Deed were incurred 
as a result of his wife signing his name to the Trust Deed and 
not by subsequent recording of the Trust Deed. Consequently, 
alleged damages cannot be causally connected to the 
notarization or the subsequent recording of the Trust Deed, 
Finally, Respondent Overland asserts that any 
damages allegedly suffered by Dale L. Larson are in fact 
nonexistent. If Dale Larson did not sign the Trust Deed as 
alleged, his interest in and to the subject property was not 
and could not be effected by any notarization or recording 
thereof. Consequently, his interest in and to the home 
remained intact until it was sold to partially satisfy his 
liability incurred under the terms of the Guaranty Agreement. 
Moreover/ any attorneys fees incurred by Petitioners would 
have been incurred regardless of whether the Trust Deed had 
been recorded or not, since enforceability was not premised 
upon recording. 
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Inasmuch as Petitioners can offer absolutely no 
explanation with regard to the causal connection between the 
notarization and damages allegedly suffered, and have further 
made no evidentiary showing of damages, the District Court 
properly awarded Respondents Western and Milne summary 
judgment, and such summary judgment was properly affirmed by 
the Court of Appeals. 
D. PETITIONEES ISSUFS FAIL TO SATISFY RULE 46 U.R.A.P. 
CONSIDERATIONS AND GUIDELINES 
Rule 46, U.R.A.P. sets forth general guidelines 
regarding the character of issues warranting issuance of a 
writ of certiorari. Such general guidelines, while not 
exhaustive, include instances where: (1) a decision is shown 
to conflict with a previous decision of another panel of the 
Court of Appeals on the same issue of law; (2) a decision of 
the Court of Appeals is shown to be in conflict with the 
previous decision of the Supreme Court; (3) a decision is 
shown to be so far departed trom the accepted and usual course 
of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of Supreme 
Court power of supervision; or (4) when the Court of Appeals 
has decided an important question of municipal, state, or 
federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by the 
Supreme Court. 
Petitioners have made no clear demonstration 
satisfying any of the aforementioned considerations, and 
therefore have failed to satisfy even the minimal guidelines 
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set forth by Rule 46. Petitioners merely seek review of 
unfavorable determinations rather than a settlement of 
conflict of law issues, or a rectification of decisions "far 
departed from the accepted usual course of judicial 
proceedings." In the absence of specific issue qualification, 
and with Petitioners7 failure to provide any absence of a 
genuine "special and important reason" upon which to base an 
award of writ of certiorari constitutes sufficient grounds for 
this Court to exercise its discretion to deny Petitioners' 
petition. See Rule 46 U.R.A.P. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Respondent 
Overland respectfully requests that this Court deny 
Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
DATED this /£> ~ day of January, 1992. 
ALLEN HARDY EVANS RASMUSSEN & JONES 
Robert L. Payne, Es 
Attorneys for Appellee-Respondent 
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Co. v. St. Joseph High School Bd. of Fin. 
Trustees, 794 P.2d 505 (Utah App.1990), to 
support its argument. 
In Jacobsen, the court stated "if a judg-
ment is voluntarily paid, which is accepted, 
and a judgment satisfied, the controversy 
has become moot and the right to appeal is 
waived/' Id. at 506 (quoting Jensen v. 
Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154, 156, 514 P 2d 1142, 
1143 (1973)). The defendant in Jacobsen 
fully paid a judgment and proffered a satis-
faction of judgment, which was executed. 
Neither party suggested any possibility of 
appeal. The defendant later appealed, and 
the plaintiff successfully sought to dismiss 
the appeal. The defendant alleged that the 
appeal involved issues distinct from the 
judgment, and claimed that the appeal 
should not be dismissed. The defendant 
relied on the doctrine that one may partial-
ly fulfill a judgment when the portion paid 
can clearly be attributed to a claim which is 
entirely separate and distinct from the is-
sues appealed. See Jensen, 30 Utah 2d at 
157, 514 P.2d at 1143. 
West Valley City offered a partial satis-
faction to Majestic, which was rejected by 
counsel for Majestic, who claimed that a 
partial satisfaction cannot be made for a 
specific portion of the judgment. A revised 
statement of partial satisfaction was exe-
cuted. Majestic insisted on deletion of any 
reference to specific portions of the contro-
versy. Majestic and the City stipulated 
that neither party waived any rights to 
appeal. Majestic now seeks to avoid the 
effect of the very language included to 
allay its own concerns—a tactic that is not 
only untenable but quite unnecessary given 
the strength of its position on the merits. 
We hold that the partial satisfaction did not 
waive West Valley City's right to this ap-
peal.6 
CONCLUSION 
Because West Valley City has failed to 
properly marshal the evidence and show 
6. In condemnation proceedings, Utah law pro-
vides a mechanism for prejudgment payment of 
a condemnation award. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-34-9 (1987). We cannot determine from 
the record before us whether this statute is 
directly applicable. However, we believe the 
statute evidences a legislative desire that con-
the court's findings to be clearly erroneous, 
the court's factual findings remain undis-
turbed. No challenge can be raised to the 
parol evidence relied on by the trial court 
when no objection was mad8 at trial. We 
see no error in the court's legal conclu-
sions. The court's decision and award are 
affirmed. 
BENCH, P.J., and GREENWOOD. J., 
concur. 
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Dale L. LARSON; Grethe Larson; and 
Systematic Builders, Inc., Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
OVERLAND THRIFT AND LOAN; Lin-
da D. Milne; and Western Surety Com-
pany, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 900411-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct. 17, 1991. 
Lessee and his wife brought suit 
against assignee of lessor's interest in 
equipment lease, notary and notary's insur-
er to rescind deed of trust on home given 
as additional security for equipment lease 
after lease went into default and assignee 
initiated foreclosure on home. The District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Scott Daniels, J., 
entered summary judgment in favor of de-
fendants on certain issues, and lessees ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Bench, P.J., 
held that: (1) equipment transaction was 
demnation awards, to the extent not disputed, 
be paid as speedily as possible even though 
disagreement remains about whether more 
should be paid. West Valley City's tender of 
partial satisfaction seems fully consistent with 
this policy. 
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true lease and not security agreement; (2) 
claim of duress was unsupported; 3^) mate-
rial issue of fact existed precluding sum-
mary judgment on claim of fraud; (4) 
house was subject to execution, regardless 
of nature of guaranty also given by les-
sees, where house was expressly pledged 
as security in lease: and '5i there was no 
causal connection between notary s alleged 
faise notarization and acknowledgement or 
trust document and loss )f r.ome. 
Affirmed in part and reversed .n part. 
1. Secured Transactions 3=10 
Equipment lease was true lease and 
not security agreement even thougn :t con-
tained purchase option for purchase of 
property at conclusion of lease, where pur-
chase option did not provide for only nom-
inal consideration. U.C.A.1953. 70A-1-
201(37). 
2. Appeal and Error 5=762 
Issue raised for first time in reply 
brief would not be considered on appeal to 
Court of Appeals. Rules App.Proc, Rule 
24(c). 
3. Judgment <3=>185.3(21) 
Defendant was entitled to summary 
judgment on claim of duress based on 
statements made by plaintiff in her deposi-
tion, contrary to her position in pleadings, 
that were not later modified by cross-exam-
ination at deposition. 
4. Judgment <3=>181(33) 
Material issue of fact as to whether 
lessee was induced to sign trust deed on 
home to secure equipment lease based on 
fraudulent misrepresentations on which 
she reasonably relied precluded summary 
judgment on lessees' fraud claim seeking 
to cancel trust deed. 
5. Mortgages <3=>335 
Lessee's house was subject to fore-
closure independent of their guaranty of 
equipment lease where hou.^ e was express-
ly pledged as additional security in equip-
ment lease and was secured by means of 
trust deed; thus foreclosure could be initi-
ated on house regardless <-f nature of guar-
anty. 
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6. Acknowledgment §=*48 
Allegation that trust deed was not 
signed in notary's presence could not sup-
port fraud claim against notary based on 
subsequent foreclosure on home pursuant 
to trust deed inasmuch as notarization was 
not essential between parties to convey 
right to foreclose upon default; trust deed 
could have been foreclosed upon whether 
or not it was recorded; improper notariza-
tion did not create or alter legal relation-
ship between parties, but merely made in-
strument recordable. U.C.A.I953, 57-3-1, 
57-3-2(3). 
7. Costs <3=*260(5) 
Appellees were entitled tc single costs 
and reasonable attorney fees based on ap-
pellant's frivolous appeal of determination 
that notary's alleged false notarization of 
trust deed did not cause appellees to lose 
their home through foreclosure where ap-
peal was not accompanied by any legal 
argument showing how notarization caused 
loss of home or by any good faith argu-
ment to extend, modify or reverse existing 
law. Rules App.Proc. Rule 33. 
Joseph H. Bottum and David W. Brown, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appel-
lants. 
Jeffrey M. Jones, Michael L. Dowdle, and 
Robert Payne, Salt Lake City, for defen-
dant and appellee Overland Thrift and 
Loan. 
Joseph Dunbeck, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendants and appellees Milne, and Western 
Sur. 
Before BENCH, GREENWOOD and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
A deed of trust was recorded on the 
Larsons' home in favor of Overland Thrift 
and Loan (Overland) as additional security 
for the lease financing of industrial equip-
ment. The lease went into default and 
Overland repossessed the equipment and 
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initiated foreclosure on the home. The 
Larsons sued to rescind the trust deed and 
to enjoin the foreclosure sale. The district 
court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the defendants and the Larsons appeal 
following final certification of judgment 
under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b). 
We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
I. FACTS 
On November 27, 1984, a lease financing 
agreement was entered into between PFC, 
a lease broker, as lessor: and. Dale L. 
Larson and Robert J. Lucking, partners in 
L & L Wire EDM, as lessees, for the five-
year lease of industrial equipment. The 
agreement specifically referred to a home 
owned by Dale Larson and Grethe Larson 
as additional security pledged for the 
leased equipment that had been supplied by 
Intermountain Machine Tool (Intermoun-
tain). In connection with the lease financ-
ing agreement, Dale Larson and Robert 
Lucking also signed an equipment lease 
guaranty as co-guarantors. 
On November 20, 1984, PFC employee 
Ray Welling delivered to the Larsons a 
trust deed prepared for their signatures. 
The trust deed named the Larsons as 
grantors of the trust deed on their home 
owned in joint tenancy, and Overland as 
beneficiary. The trust deed expressly stat-
ed it was "being recorded for additional 
securing [sic] on a lease for Robert J. Luck-
ing & Dale L. Larson dba L & L Wire EDM 
in the amount of $112,185.92 on lease num-
ber 312 401 Dated November 7, 1984." Af-
ter the trust deed was executed, Linda 
Milne notarized and recorded it. 
The day after the lease financing agree-
ment was signed, PFC formally assigned 
its interest in the lease to Overland. 
Monthly lease payments were made until 
September 2, 1986, when the lease went 
into default. A flurry of activity then fol-
lowed. The Larsons gave Systematic 
Builders a warranty deed on their home on 
January 21, 1987. Two days later, Over-
land recorded a Notice of Breach and Elec-
tion to sell the Larson home and a trustee's 
sale was set for May 27, 1987. Systematic 
Builders subsequently recorded its warran-
ty deed on February 5, 1987. Overland 
repossessed the equipment on February 15. 
1987, and sold it for 510,750 over a year 
later. 
In order to save their home from fore-
closure, the Larsons filed suit on May 19, 
1987, to rescind the trust deed as a consum-
er credit transaction under 15 U.S.C. 
j 1635(b), and to enjoin the trustee's sale. 
Although Dale Larson denied ever signing 
the trust deed, Grethe Larson admitted re-
sponsibility for placing both his and her 
signatures on the deed and the lease, but 
claimed she did so because of fraud and 
coercion. Grethe Larson also alleged the 
notary Linda Milne was not present when 
the documents were signed. The district 
court denied the Larsons' application for a 
preliminary injunction and the real proper-
ty was sold to Overland for $51,864.90. 
The Larsons requested leave to file an 
amended complaint and, by August 1, 1988. 
had filed four more amended complaints 
due, in large part, to their failure adequate-
ly to plead fraud. Counterclaims were 
filed and, after discovery and depositions, 
Milne and Western Surety moved for sum-
mary judgement. Overland soon followed 
with two separate motions for partial sum-
mary judgment. 
The district court granted the motion for 
summary judgment filed by Milne and 
Western Surety and dismissed with preju-
dice the Larsons' fraud claims against the 
notary and the bond company. The court 
next granted Overland's motion for partial 
summary judgment, and dismissed all 
claims asserted by Systematic Builders. 
At the same time, the court dismissed the 
Larsons' claims against Overland for 
"fraud, duress and so on"; ordered the 
transfer of Grethe Larson's one-half inter-
est in the Larsons' home to Overland; de-
termined that the "lease" was, as a matter 
of law, a true lease and not a security 
agreement; ordered that Dale Larson was 
fully obligated on the guaranty; entered 
judgment against Dale Larson on the lease 
due to his status as a partner in L & L 
Wire; and, denied the Larsons' claims that 
enforcement of the lease allowed double 
recovery and penalty because Overland 
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only sought to recover amounts due after 
offset from sale proceeds. 
The district court later granted Over-
land's second motion for partial summary 
judgment on the remaining counts: that 
the sale of the equipment )y Overland was 
made in good faith: and. that Dale Larson 
was liable under the lease for S69.883.S0. 
The court then certified rh^ judgments as 
final under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(b). 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate when 
there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. LMV Leasing, 
Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189, 192 (Utah 
App.1991). In determining whether the tri-
al court correctly found that there was no 
genuine issue of material fact, we review 
the facts and inferences from them in the 
light most favorable to the losing party. 
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Pairing, Inc. 
v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382. 1385 (Utah 
1989). We review conclusions of law for 
correctness and give no deference to the 
trial court. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
Utah v. State of Utah, 779 P 2d 634, 636-
37 (Utah 1989). 
The interpretation of a contract can 
present either a question of law, to be 
determined by the words of the agreement, 
or a question of fact, to be determined by 
extrinsic evidence. Kimball v. Campbell, 
699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 19*5). Interpreta-
tion of an unambiguous contract is a ques-
tion of law and does not require any defer-
ence to the conclusions oi the thai court. 
LMV Leasing, 805 P 2d at 192. If the 
terms of an agreement are clear and unam-
biguous, we interpret them according to 
1. The Larsons present n«. argument that words 
are missing within the term* themselves or that 
other deficiencies in the contract would have 
required extrinsic or parol e\ idence to resolve 
any uncertainty. We ^ontlude the terms of the 
contract are clear and unambiguous and may be 
interpreted in accordance u::h their plain and 
ordinary meaning 
2. In Colonial Leasing, the- M.p»-eme court said: 
Numerous factors K-ar »>n determining 
whether the terms <>l an averment *how that 
it was meant to be a lease a sccuntv agree 
) THRIFT AND LOAN Utah 1319 
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their plain and ordinary meaning and ex-
trinsic or parol evidence is generally not 
admissible to explain the intent of the par-
ties. Faulkner v. Famsworth, 665 P.2d 
1292, 1293 (Utah 1983); Valley Bank & 
Trust Co. v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co.. 776 
P.2d 933, 936 (Utah App.1989). 
Language is ambiguous if the words 
used to express the intent n the parties 
are insufficient so that the :ontract may be 
understood to reach two or more piausibir 
meanings. Property Assistance Corp. 1 
Roberts, 768 P.2d 976. 977 -Utah App.1989) 
When a contract is ambiguous because of 
uncertainty in the meaning of terms, the 
absence of terms or other facial deficien-
cies, parol evidence is admissible to explain 
the intent of the parties. Faulkner, 665 
P.2d at 1293. Whether an ambiguity exists 
is a question of law to be decided before 
parol evidence may be admitted. Id. The 
language of a contract is not necessarily 
ambiguous merely because a party urges a 
different meaning that is more in accord-
ance with its own interests. Village Inn 
Apartments v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co. 790 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah App.1990). 
III. LEGAL NATURE OF 
THE AGREEMENT 
[1] The Larsons cite Colonial Leasing 
Co. of New England v. Larsen Bros. 
Const. Co., 731 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986), 
for the proposition that the character of a 
transaction, as a lease or a security agree-
ment, "may be" ambiguous when taken as 
a whole even though specific terms are 
not.1 The supreme court identified numer-
ous factors in Colonial Leasing that may 
bear upon whether a lease or a security 
agreement was intended.2 
ment. Among others, those factors are 
whether (1) the lessor is a financier, (2) the 
lessee is required to insure the goods in favor 
of the lessor, (3) the lessee bears the risk of 
loss or damage, (4) the lessee is to pay the 
taxes, repairs, and maintenance, (5) the agree-
ment establishes default provisions governing 
acceleration and resale, (6) a substantial non-
refundable deposit is required, (7) the goods 
are to be selected from a third party by the 
lessee, (8) the rental payments were equiva-
lent to the costs of the goods plus interest, (9) 
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In addition to the presence of several 
lease terms that were identified as factors 
in Colonial Leasing, the Larsons note the 
existence of an option to purchase the 
equipment, and the treatment of their 
home as "additional security" as indica-
tions that the parties intended a security 
agreement. In LMV Leading, 305 ?.2d at 
196, this court identified ownership (or its 
functional equivalent) and the means to 
transfer ownership (such as a purchase op-
tion) as a key distinction between a lease 
and a security agreement. 
Under the express language of the lease, 
however, Dale Larson and Robert Lucking 
acquired no ownership interest, right or 
title in the equipment other than a lease-
hold: 
9. OWNERSHIP, PERSONAL PROP-
ERTY: Equipment is and shall at ail 
times remain, the property of Lessor; 
and Lessee shall have no right, tide or 
interest therein or thereto except as ex-
pressly set forth in this Lease[.] Equip-
ment is, and shall at all times be and 
remain, personal property notwithstand-
ing that Equipment or any part thereof 
may now be, or hereafter become, in any 
manner affixed or attached to real prop-
erty or any building thereon. 
Dale Larson and Robert Lucking were, 
however, granted an option to purchase the 
equipment for fair market value at the end 
of the lease period: 
11. OPTION TO PURCHASE: Lessee 
shall have an option to purchase Equip-
ment at the end of the lease period for 
FAIR MARKET VALUE at the time plus 
all obligations remaining due under this 
Lease. Notice of exercise of this option 
must be given in writing to Lessor or 
Lessor's assignee at least thirty (30) days 
prior to the expiration of the Lease. 
the lessor lacks facilities to store or retake the 
goods, (10) the lease may be discounted with 
a bank, (11) the warranties usually found in 
leases are omitted, and (12) the goods or 
fixtures are impractical to remove 
731 P.2d at 487 (citing J. White & R Summers, 
Handbook of the Law Under the I niform Com-
mercial Code 882-83 (2d ed. 1^80)). But see 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-l-20U37Nc) (1990) (ne-
gating impact of Colonial leasing factors (2), 
(3), and (4)). 
This option shall terminate and be avoid 
[sic] upon termination of this lease by 
reason of Lessee's default. 
The issue thus presented is whether an 
option to purchase leased equipment for 
fair market value is indicative of a lease or 
a security agreement. On this point, Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-1-20K37) (1980), pro-
vides: 
Whether a lease is intended as security is 
to be determined by che facts of each 
case; however, (a) the inclusion of an 
option to purchase does not itself make 
the lease one intended for security, and 
(b) an agreement that upon compliance 
with the terms of the lease the lessee 
shall become or has the option to become 
the owner of the property for no addi-
tional consideration or for a nominal con-
sideration does make the lease one in-
tended for security. 
Under this statute, the inclusion of an 
option is not necessarily determinative of 
the character of an agreement. The crit-
ical factor is the economic value of the 
consideration to be paid for the exercise of 
an option. The treatment of a lease as a 
true lease or a security agreement based 
on the economic value of consideration to 
be paid was further explained by a 1990 
amendment to section 70A-1-201(37).3 The 
statute now provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
(b) Whether a transaction creates a 
lease or a security interest is determined 
by the facts of each case; however, a 
transaction creates a security interest if 
the consideration the lessee is to pay the 
lessor for the right to possession and use 
of the goods is an obligation for the term 
of the lease not subject to termination by 
the lessee, and: 
3. Retroactive application of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-l-201(37)(b) (1990) to the issue before us 
is permissible because the amendments merely 
clarify or amplify the understanding of the for-
mer law. See Department of Social Servs. v. 
Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1001 (Utah 1982); Okland 
Const. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 520 P.2d 208 
(Utah 1974). 
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(iv) the lessee has an option to be-
come the owner of the goods for no 
additional or nominal additional consid-
eration bpon compliance with the lease 
agreement. 
(d) For purposes of this subsection: 
(i) Additional consideration is not 
nominal if . . . when the option to be-
come the owner of the goods is grant-
ed to the lessee the price is stated to 
be the fair market value of the goods 
determined at the time the option is to 
be performed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-20K37) (1990). 
Although a lease with an option to pur-
chase for no additional or nominal addition-
al consideration constitutes a security 
agreement under subsection (b)(iv). a pur-
chase option at fair market value is not 
nominal under the definition of additional 
consideration in (d)(i). Since the purchase 
option was not nominal and the Larsons 
have not raised any argument with respect 
to the economic life of the equipment,4 we 
conclude that the lease is a true lease and 
not a security agreement. 
[2] Accordingly, we do not address the 
commercial reasonableness of the sale be-
cause the lease is not a security agreement 
and a commercially reasonable sale was not 
required under the lease. In addition, we 
dismiss the claim that failure to dispose of 
the equipment in a commercially reason-
able manner allowed for double recovery 
and penalty since Overland is entitled to 
recover amounts due under the lease after 
offset from sale proceeds.5 
IV. FRAUD AND DURESS CLAIMS 
AGAINST OVERLAND 
[3,4] On appeal, the Larsons argue 
that they were induced to enter into the 
4. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-l-201(37)(b)(i)-
(iii); LMV Leasing, 805 P.2d at 196 n. 6. 
5. The Larsons challenge the award of attorney 
fees by the trial court as an additional issue on 
appeal. The issue was not listed in the state-
ment of issues presented for review in their 
opening brief, but was raised for the first time 
in their reply brief. Rule 24(c) of the Appellate 
Rules of Procedure limits answers in a reply 
brief to new matter in the appellee's brief. The 
issue of attorney fees was not raised as new 
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lease by the fraudulent representations of 
Overland or its agents and that the ques-
tion of reasonable reliance raises issues of 
fact that preclude summary judgment. In 
support of their argument, the Larsons re-
fer in general to the allegations in the 
amended pleadings, and the affidavit of 
Grethe Larson. The Larsons also cite 
Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title 
Ins. Co.. 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 1983) 
(negligent misrepresentation); Pace v. 
ParrisK 122 Utah 141, 247 ?.2d 273, 274-
75 ('Utah 1952) (fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion); and, Conder v. A.L. Williams and 
Assocs. Inc.. 739 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah App. 
1987) (fraudulent misrepresentation). 
However, the allegations referred to sup-
port both a claim of fraud as well as du-
ress, and much of the confusion in this case 
stems from the parties' failure to distin-
guish between the claims of fraud and du-
ress. 
Grethe Larson made several allegations 
in her affidavit and the "Amended Fourth 
Amended Complaint" that relate to fraud. 
Grethe Larson alleges that PFC employee 
Welling brought several unidentified doc-
uments to her home on November 20, 1984, 
to close the deal on the equipment lease. 
Grethe Larson claims Welling told her 
about a separate agreement between Inter-
mountain and PFC in favor of Overland to 
"buy back" the equipment for $35,000 in 
case of default, and that money from the 
sale of the equipment would offset the 
Larsons' total potential liability of $75,000 
under the guaranty. Grethe Larson also 
claimed that Welling said if monthly pay-
ments were made and there were no de-
fault, the guaranty would be released and 
the Larson home would not be involved in 
the transaction for more than a year. 
matter, either directly or by inference, in appel-
lee's brief. We decline consideration of the 
argument, therefore, for failure to comply with 
the briefing requirement of the rules. See 
Christertsen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 72 (Utah 
App. 1991); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of CaL, 
746 P.2d 1182, 1184-85 (Utah App.1987). See 
also Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 
962 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 
(Utah 1988). 
1322 Utah 818 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Grethe Larson also made allegations that 
related to duress. Grethe Larson alleged 
that Welling insisted she sign the doc-
uments immediately, and that he held the 
documents fast to the table with only their 
signature blanks exposed. Grethe Larson 
avers Welling told her there was no time to 
read the documents and prevented her 
from reading them. Grethe Larson also 
said she was not told that a crust leea was 
included among the documents ^ne signed. 
Grethe Larson said she felt rusnea. but in 
reliance on Weiling's representations. 
signed both her name and her ausband's 
name to the documents without reading 
them or knowing what they really were. 
After she executed the documents. Grethe 
Larson claimed Welling took them with him 
to be notarized and promised to return that 
same day with copies. However. Grethe 
Larson stated she was never given any 
copies. 
Grethe Larson was later deposed and 
stated, among other things, that Welling 
actually had handed her the documents, 
and that she not only had the opportunity, 
but could have read them if she wanted. 
She also said Welling never told her she 
could not read the documents, but that she 
felt he was in a hurry and, for reasons of 
her own, chose not to. On the basis of 
these contradictions in her statements, Ov-
erland brought a motion for summary judg-
ment that quoted from portions of the dep-
osition at length. The trial court ruled 
there was "no evidence" to support the 
claims of "fraud, duress and so on." 
In Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-
73 (Utah 1983), the supreme court held that 
when a party takes a clear position in a 
deposition that is not later modified on 
cross-examination, he may not raise contra-
dictory statements in his own affidavit as 
issues of fact unless he can explain the 
discrepancy. Because of the contradictory 
statements in her deposition that were not 
later modified, we affirm the judgment of 
the trial court on the issue of "duress and 
so on/' However, since Overland's motion 
for summary judgment addressed only 
those statements relating to duress, we 
decline to affirm summary judgment on the 
fraud claim. Disposition of the duress 
ciaim does not resolve the fraud claim, in 
addition, Overland proffered no evidence to 
counter the Larsons' allegations of agency 
other than a bald assertion that it did not 
exist. 
Accordingly, there was no basis for the 
trial court to grant summary judgment on 
the issue of fraud. The trial court errea, 
therefore, in dismissing the fraud claim 
against Overland. We reverse and remana 
the fraud ciaim for further proceedings. 
V THE TRUST DEED 
AS A CONDITIONAL 
GUARANTY 
[5] The Larsons argue that the trust 
deed must be construed as a conditional 
guaranty that obligates Grethe Larson to 
answer for the debt of her husband and 
Robert Lucking, the lessees, but only after 
Overland first exhausts the security and 
establishes a deficiency. Failure to ex-
haust the security, the Larsons claim, re-
leases them from the guaranty and pre-
vents foreclosure. See, e.g., Carrier Bro-
kers, Inc. v. Spanish Trail, 751 P.2d 258, 
261 (Utah App.1988) (a conditional guaran-
ty is not immediately enforceable upon de-
fault, but requires some contingency to 
happen to fix liability. The creditor may be 
required by the terms of the guaranty to 
pursue the debtor first or designated secur-
ity, or both, and failure to do so releases 
the guarantor.) 
The Larsons' argument on conditional 
guaranties, however, is not on point. The 
Larson house was expressly pledged as 
additional security in the equipment lease 
and was secured by means of the trust 
deed. The house is, therefore, subject to 
foreclosure independent of the guaranty. 
Inasmuch as Overland could have executed 
against any and all security pledged. Over-
land could initiate foreclosure on the house 
regardless of the nature of the guaranty. 
VI. FRAUD CLAIMS AGAINST MILNE 
AND WESTERN SURETY 
[6] The Larsons appeal the dismissal of 
their claims against Linda Milne, a notary, 
and Western Surety, the bond company 
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insuring Milne as a notary, for Milne's 
false notarization and acknowledgment of 
the trust deed. The Larsons claim the 
trust deed was not*signed in Milne's pres-
ence and that proximate cause is an issue 
of fact. The Larsons cite DeCamp v. Al-
len. 156 So.2d 661 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1963), 
and Collins & Sons Fine Jewelry, Inc. v. 
Carolina Safety Sys.t Inc., 296 S.C. 219, 
371 S.E.2d 539 (App.1988). for the proposi-
tion that a notary who improperly authenti-
cates a document that results in detrimen-
tal reliance by innocent third persons will 
be liable for fraud. 
Although the facts regarding execution 
of the documents are in dispute, we are 
required to adopt the Larsons' version for 
purposes of this review. In order to pre-
vail against summary judgment, however, 
the Larsons must prove a causal connection 
between the notarization and the loss of 
their home. 
An acknowledgment or other proof of 
execution, such as a notarization, is a pre-
requisite to recording a deed of trust or 
other conveyance of real property under 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-1 (1990). Record-
ing protects the beneficiaries of a trust 
deed against subsequent buyers by impart-
ing notice, but neither recording nor nota-
rization is a necessary condition to enforce 
a trust deed between parties to a convey-
ance. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-2(3) (1990); 
Gregerson v. Jensen, 669 P.2d 396 (Utah 
1983); Horman v. Clark, 744 P.2d 1014 
(Utah App.1987). Accordingly, notarization 
did not give Overland the right to foreclose 
inasmuch as Overland could have foreclos-
ed on the home whether or not the trust 
deed was recorded. The Larsons, there-
fore, could not prevail on these facts be-
cause any improper notarization did not 
create or alter the legal relationship be-
tween the Larsons and Overland. 
[7] The Larsons offer absolutely no ex-
planation as to how third parties relied on 
the notarization and how the reliance 
caused the Larsons to lose their home. In-
asmuch as the Larsons could have lost 
their home without any acknowledgment 
and they offered no further explanation on 
how the notarization caused them to lose 
their home, or any other good faith argu-
ment to extend, modify or reverse existing 
law, we deem the appeal on this issue to be 
frivolous. Accordingly, we affirm the 
judgment of the trial court -n favor of 
Milne and Western Surety and grant them 
single costs and reasonable attorney fees 
to Milne and Western Surety pursuant to 
their request under Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 33. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the agreement in this 
case was a lease and not a security agree-
ment. We conclude that the claim of du-
ress was unsupported. We also conclude 
that the house was subject to execution, 
regardless of the nature of the guaranty, 
because it was expressly pledged as securi-
ty in the lease. Although we affirm these 
rulings in favor of Overland, we reverse 
the summary judgment on the claim of 
fraud, and remand the case to the trial 
court for further proceedings on that issue. 
We also affirm the judgment of the trial 
court on the claims against Milne and 
Western Surety. We award them single 
costs and reasonable attorney fees as re-
quested under Utah Rule of Appellate Pro-
cedure 33, since the Larsons' appeal 
against these parties is frivolous. 
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ., 
concur. 
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APPENDIX B 
TITLE VII. 
JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO COURT OF APPEALS. 
Rule 45. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of 
Court of Appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a 
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be 
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
Rule 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discre-
tion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The follow-
ing, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's 
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the 
Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision;-or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be settled 
by the Supreme Court. ' 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but 
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified 
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the re-
quirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 1989 
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(legal description) 
Signature of Trustee 
1985 
57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee — Ac-
tion to recover balance due upon obli-
gation for which trust deed was given 
as security — Collection of costs and 
attorney's fees. 
At any time within three months after any sale of 
property under a trust deed, as hereinabove provided, 
an action may be commenced to recover the balance 
due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was 
given as security, and in such action the complaint 
shall set forth the entire amount of the indebtedness 
which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for 
which such property was sold, and the fair market 
value thereof at the date of sale. Before rendering 
judgment, the court shall find the fair market value 
at the date of sale of the property sold. The court may 
not render judgment for more than the amount by 
which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, 
costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and 
attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the 
property as of the date of the sale. In any action 
brought under this section, the prevailing party shall 
be entitled to collect its costs and reasonable attorney 
fees incurred in bringing an action under this section. 
1985 
48-1-12. Nature of partner's liability. 
All partners are liable: 
(1) Jointly and severally for everything 
chargeable to the partnership under Sections 
48-1-10 and 48-1-11. 
(2) Jointly for all other debts and obligations 
of the partnership; but any partner may enter 
into a separate obligation to perform a partner-
ship contract. las? 
(37) (a) "Security interest" means an interest 
in personal property or fixtures which se-
cures payment or performance of an obliga-
tion. The retention or reservation of title by 
a seller of goods, notwithstanding shipment 
or delivery to the buyer as provided in Sec-
tion 70A-2-401, is limited in effect to a reser-
vation of a "security interest." The term also 
includes any interest of a buyer of accounts 
or chattel paper which is subject to Chapter 
9 of this title. The special property interest of 
a buyer of goods on identification of those 
goods to a contract for sale under Section 
70A-2-401 is not a "security interest," but a 
buyer may also acquire a "security interest" 
by complying with Chapter 9 of this title. 
Unless a consignment is intended as secu-
rity, reservation of title under the consign-
ment is not a "security interest." A consign-
ment in any event is subject to the provisions 
on consignment sales provided in Section 
70A-2-326. 
(b) Whether a transaction creates a lease 
or security interest is determined by the 
facts of each case; however, a transaction 
creates a security interest if the consider-
ation the lessee is to pay the lessor for the 
right to possession and use of the goods is an 
obligation for the term of the lease not sub-
ject to termination by the lessee, and: 
(i) the original term of the lease is 
equal to or greater than the remaining 
economic life of the goods; 
(ii) the lessee is bound to renew the 
lease for the remaining economic life of 
the goods or is bound to become the 
owner of the goods; 
(iii) the lessee has an option to renew 
the lease for the remaining economic life 
of the goods for no additional consider-
ation or nominal additional consider-
ation upon compliance with the lease 
agreement; or 
(iv) the lessee has an option to become 
the owner of the goods for no additional 
consideration or nominal additional con-
sideration upon compliance with the 
lease agreement. 
(c) A transaction does not create a secu-
rity interest merely because it provides that: 
(i) the present value of the consider-
ation the lessee is obligated to pay the 
lessor for the right to possession and use 
of the goods is substantially equal to or 
is greater than the fair market value of 
the goods at the time the lease is entered 
into; 
(ii) the lessee assumes risk of loss of 
the goods, or agrees to pay taxes, insur-
ance, filing, recording, or registration 
fees, or service or maintenance costs 
with respect to the goods; 
(iii) the lessee has an option to renew 
the lease or to become the owner of the 
roods: 
(iv) the lessee has an option to renew 
the lease for a fixed rent that is equal to 
or greater than the reasonably predict-
able fair market rent for the use of the 
goods for the term of the renewal at the 
time the option is to be performed; or 
(v) the lessee has an option to become 
the owner of the goods for a fixed price 
that is equal to or greater than the rea-
sonably predictable fair market value of 
the goods at the time the option is to be 
performed, 
(d) For purposes of this subsection: 
(i) Additional consideration is not 
nominal if, when the option to renew the 
lease is granted to the lessee, the rent is 
stated to be the fair market Tent for the 
use of the goods for the term of the re-
newal determined at the time the option 
is to be performed, or when the option to 
become the owner of the goods is granted 
to the lessee the price is stated to be the 
fair market value of the goods deter-
mined at the time the option is to be 
performed. 
(ii) Additional consideration is nomi-
nal if it is less than the lessee's reason-
ably predictable cost of performing un-
der the lease agreement if the option is 
not exercised. 
(iii) "Reasonably predictable" and "re-
maining economic life of the goods" are 
to be determined with reference to the 
facts and circumstances at the time the 
transaction is entered into. 
(iv) "Present value" means the 
amount as of a date certain of one or 
more sums payable in the future, dis-
counted to the date certain. The discount 
is determined by the interest rate speci-
fied by the parties if the rate is not man-
ifestly unreasonable at the time the 
transaction is entered into; otherwise, 
the discount is determined by a commer-
cially reasonable rate that takes into ac-
count the facts and circumstances of 
each case at the time the transaction 
was entered into. 
(38) "Send" in connection with any writing or 
notice means to deposit in the mail or deliver for 
transmission by any other usual means of com-
munication with postage or the cost of the trans-
mission provided for and properly addressed, 
and, in the case of an instrument, to an address 
specified thereon or otherwise agreed, or if there 
be none to any address reasonable under the cir-
cumstances. The receipt of any writing or notice 
within the time at which it would have arrived if 
properly sent has the effect of a proper sending. 
(39) "Signed" includes any symbol executed or 
adopted by a party with present intention to au-
thenticate a writing. 
(40) "Surety" includes guarantor. 
(41) "Telegram" includes a message transmit-
ted by radio, teletype, cable, any mechanical 
method of transmission, or the like. 
(42) 'Term" means that portion of an agree-
ment which relates to a particular matter. 
(43) "Unauthorized signature or indorsement" 
means one made without actual, implied, or ap-
parent authority and includes a forgery. 
APPENDIX D 
EQUIPMENT LEASE GUARANTY 
"5SEE: R o b e r t J« Lucking & Dale L. Larson dba L & L Wire EDM 
LISSOR: P.F.C., Inc. 
291 West 5400 South, Suite 200 
Murray, Utah 84107 
.EASE NO. 504 5 5-5 
"APE OF LEASE: 11-27-84 
In order to induce P.F.C., Inc., hereinafter called the Lessor, to enter into the 
cove referenced lease with Lessee, and to grant to the Lessee such renewals, extensions, 
''orbearances, releases, or other relinquishment of legal rights as the Lessor may deem 
^dvisable, and for other valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby duly 
acknowledged, the undersigned, hereinafter call the Guarantor, who, if two or more in 
.jnber, shall be jointly or severally bound, hereby guarantees as surety, absolutely and 
.^conditionally, to the Lessor, its successors and assigns, the full and prompt performance 
f^ all the covenants, conditions, and agreements under the above-referenced lease, by the 
"essee, Lessee's successors and assigns, and expressly agrees that the validity of this 
.j^ 'eement and the obligations of the Guarantor hereunder shall in no way be terminated, 
ffected, or impaired by reason of the granting by the Lessor of any indulgence to the 
\essee or by reason of the assertion by the Lessor against the Lessee of any of the rights 
jr remedies reserved to the Lessor pursuant to the provisions of such lease or otherwise 
-vailabie. to the Lessor or by the release of the Lessee from any of the Lessee's obligations 
under such lease by operation of law or otherwise, the Guarantor hereby waiving all 
3uretyship defenses. The Guarantor further covenants and agrees that this guaranty shall 
remain and continue in full force and effect as to any renewal, modification, or extension 
?f such lease whether or not the Guarantor shall have .received any notice of or consented 
zo such renewal, modification, or extension. The Guarantor further agrees that its liability 
.jider this guaranty shall be primary, and that in any right of action which shall accrue to 
he Lessor under such lease, the Lessor may at its option proceed against the Guarantor 
<nd the Lessee, jointly or severally, and may proceed against the Guarantor without having 
-jommenced any action against or having obtained any judgment against the Lessee. 
The failure of the Lessor to insist in any one or more instances upon a strict performance 
:r observance of any of the terms, provisions, or covenants of the aforesaid lease or to 
exercise any right therein contained shall not be construed or deemed to be a waiver or 
relinquishment for the future of such term, provision, covenant or right, but the same shall 
:ontinue and remain in full force and effect. Receipt by the Lessor of rent with knowledge 
->f the breach of any provision of such lease shall not be deemed a waiver of such breach. 
'.'o subletting, assignment, or other transfer of such lease, or any interest therein, shall 
.perate to extinguish or diminish the liability of the Guarantor under this guaranty, and 
•;herever reference is made to the liability of the Lessee, such reference shall be deemed 
likewise to refer to the Guarantor. 
Ihe Guarantor hereby waives a trial by jury. This guaranty shall be deemed to have been 
~aie in, and shall be interpreted and the right and liabilities of the parties determined, 
In accordance with the laws of the State of Utah; and the Guarantor agrees and consents it 
is and shall be subject to the courts of the State of Utah. All of the terms and provisions 
lereof shall inure to tne benefit of the Lessor, its successors and assigns and shall be 
binding upon the Guarantor, its successors and assigns. 
~~*\ i^ xl Individual Guarantors: 
'Robert J. Lucking <i> D x Q^
s i n T ^•T-i** <-«/^ r\ Dale L. NLarson W-
Corporate Guarantor: 
-T7EST: 
Secretary 
Name of Corporation 
By: 
Title: _^ 
(Have signed by President of Vice President)" 
'If the Guarantor is a rcrccratlon. corooratp rpsnlnMnn mn<;t- h<» «nmni^c^ \ 
